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 Current Analysis 
 “Egypt in Transition – Ready for Democracy?”  
Maya Janik / Cengiz Günay  
 
Am 7. Juni 2011 organisierte das Österreichische Institut für Internationale Politik in Zusammenarbeit mit 
IDEAZ, dem Außenministerium und der Anna-Lindh Stiftung eine Konferenz mit dem Titel: „Egypt in Transition – 
Ready for Democracy“. Es diskutierten ExpertInnen, ForscherInnen, PolitikerInnen und AktivistInnen aus Ägypten 
und dem Ausland über die Veränderungsprozesse und versuchten gemeinsam Ausblicke auf zukünftige 
Entwicklungen zu wagen. Wer sind die wichtigsten Akteure? Was ist für eine demokratische Transition 
notwendig und welche Rolle wird der Islam in Zukunft spielen? – so lauteten die grundlegenden Fragen. Die 
folgende Analyse beruht auf den wichtigsten Erkenntnissen, die aus der Konferenz gewonnen wurden. Das 
Nahost Forschungsprogramm des oiip verfolgt die aktuellen Entwicklungen in Ägypten und der Region weiter 
und bietet dazu laufend Analysen an.  
On June 7, 2011 the Austrian Institute for International Affairs organized together with the IDEAZ Institute, the 
Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs and the Anna-Lindh Foundation with the title: “Egypt in 
Transition – Ready for Democracy”. Experts, researchers, politicians and civil activists from Egypt and from 
abroad discussed the ongoing changes and tried to outline future developments. Who are the major actors? 
What is necessary for democratic transition and which role will Islam play in future? These were the 
fundamental questions. The following analysis is based on the major insights gained from the conference. The 
oiip’s Middle East Research program will continue to monitor Egypt and the region and deliver further analyses 
on developments.  
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The January revolution undeniably marks a watershed in Egypt’s modern history. 
Inspired by the Tunisian uprising, Egyptians went in to the streets. Young people 
were the spearhead in the protests against the ossified Mubarak regime. The protest 
movement quickly grew. Protesters from all walks of life demanded the downfall of 
the regime, freedom, justice and the improvement of their economic situation.  
Since President Mubarak’s departure in February 2011, the country has been ruled 
by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. From the onset, the military made it 
clear, that it had no intention to stay in power, but to “get the transition over with” as 
soon as possible. The Council put forward a roadmap and a tight time schedule for 
transition to a democratic order. The military’s plan for transition included the 
establishment of a committee for constitutional reform which was assigned with the 
task to elaborate amendments to the constitution. These were then presented in a 
referendum on March 19. The committee’s proposal was approved by a large 
majority of 77.2 per cent of the voters, while only 22 per cent voted against it.  
Debates over the constitutional amendments split the protest movement. Not only 
political and ideological differences came into the open, but also divergences over 
how to manage the transition process appeared.   
While some defended quick transition others called for time in order to guarantee real 
transition to pluralist democracy.  
Secular, leftist and liberal forces have mainly argued for a longer transitional period, 
as this would allow new formations to troop together, built up party organizations and 
become more visible. Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafist groups and 
the representatives of the old regime in contrast were to be found among those who 
defended quick transition.  
While early elections would be a boon for established groups such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the old networks of the Mubarak regime, they would catch new 
formations flat-footed.  
Representation in parliament has been extremely important as the amendments 
approved in the March referendum delegated the task of rewriting a constitution to a 
constitutional committee which will be appointed by a newly elected parliament. The 
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date of parliamentary elections, initially scheduled for September 2011 was 
postponed to November 2011.  
The Supreme Council’s handling of the transition process suggests that the army 
regards this process as a technical rather than as a political one. Concessions have 
been only made under massive pressure from the streets. While the protest 
movement had first welcomed the army, disenchantment with the handling of the 
transition process has grown. Protesters accuse the army and its head Field Marshall 
Tantawi of working for the continuity of the ancien regime.  
 
The Egyptian Revolution should not be perceived as the end, but rather as an 
outstanding event in a troublesome transformation process whose outcome is open 
and difficult to predict. The conference organized by the oiip in cooperation with the 
Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs, the Diplomatic Academy, the 
Anna-Lindh Foundation and the IDEAZ institute aimed at discussing with experts 
from Egypt and Eastern Europe the obstacles and chances in the transition process 
and to pose the question; whether continuity will prevail over change? In a second 
panel we then discussed with Egyptian civil activists, politicians and analysts the 
question of what kind of change is to be expected.  
 
 
Vladimir Gligorov spoke first reflecting the transition in 
Eastern and Southeastern European post-communist 
countries. Gligorov noted that knowledge acquired during the 
process, if only applied properly, could be of possibly helpful 
use to ease burdens of the Egyptian transformation. 
Gligorov noted that there is a big difference between the 
recent Arab freedom movements and the post-1989 
revolutions in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, as the  
post-communist transition was foreseen and its outcomes could be predicted. The 
first lesson post-communist states learnt, as Gligorov identified, is that the level of 
state legitimacy is very important for the success of the transition process. According 
to him, it was only a matter of time for the socialist regimes to collapse because their 
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state apparatuses did not seek legitimacy at all and were based explicitly on 
repression.  
The second lesson drawn from the experiences of Eastern Europe concerns 
according to Gligorov the necessity of complete power changes after a revolution for 
successful systemic reforms. Gligorov stated that, in regard to the former communist 
countries, democratization was the only way in which power could have been 
redistributed fairly. Political discontinuity in terms of institutions, the political system 
and people in power is, as explained, indispensable in order to carry out economic 
reforms. Further on, Gligorov drew attention to the fact that democracy can be an 
instrument for continuity. Therefore, reforms, which decisively redistribute power over 
ressources, were essential for political discontinuity. 
Another lesson that can be learnt from transition countries’ experiences is according 
to Gligorov that gradual strategies rarely succeed. History has shown that usually a 
shock therapy is necessary in order to engender discontinuity. Nevertheless, 
Gligorov maintained that it is difficult to predict the result of such measures as there 
are different possible outcomes. 
Furthermore, Gligorov discussed the role that nationalism and the military played 
during the transition of the European post-communist countries. The most successful 
transitions were characterized by the lack of radical nationalism and democratically 
elected governments being in control of the military. 
Finally, Gligorov emphasized the importance of international anchorage for the 
success of the transition process. According to him, international influence is decisive 
for economic reforms and the transformation of the internal political structures. The 
role of the international community, especially of the US and NATO, may significantly 
influence the outcome of the ongoing transformation process in Egypt, like it was the 
case in Eastern Europe. 
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According to Tarek Osman, the January protests 
were first and foremost a rejection of the massive 
failures of the Egyptian regimes throughout the past 
sixty years. The uprisings are, as Osman argued, 
attributed to the three factors, deeply rooted in 
Egypt’s social, political and economic development, 
especially over the last decades. 
 
The first factor is the massive growth of the Egyptian population. During the last 30 
years Egypt’s population doubled, reaching more than 80 million. The crucial fact is 
that a half of the population is under 35 years old, and many of those are 
economically unprivileged and weary of the country’s socio-political circumstances. 
The demands of these young people, including their longing for the end of Mubarak’s 
rigid regime, provided a decisive impetus for the uprisings. 
In order to understand the unexpected revolt, it is further important to bear in mind 
the fact that Egypt lacked a national project for more than 30 years. Both, Egypt’s 
attempt to emulate Europe during the period of liberal experimentation from the end 
of the 19th to the middle of the 20th century, as well as the Nasser’s experiment 
strengthening Arab nationalism throughout the 1950s and 60s, failed. 
The third relevant factor concerns Egypt’s position in the Arab world and its 
awareness of how much influence political events in Egypt exert on the rest of the 
region. Tarek Osman outlined that Egypt’s importance has always lied in its role 
among other Middle East states. The Mubarak regime, however, isolated the country, 
what consequently led to its position in the Arab world being increasingly weakened.    
 
In the second part of his speech, Tarek Osman discussed the emerging political 
dynamics, most notably the apparent battle for power between different key actors. 
Given this reality, it is hard to predict, in which direction Egypt will move. Generally, 
as argued, three broad movements in the country are trying to get a grip on enough 
power to influence the future political reality. These actors are: the military and the 
financial centers; the Islamist movement, which lacks unification as there are 
distinctions between the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood on the one hand, and 
many of its young members, conservative groups and liberal Muslims on the other 
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one; and finally the Liberals as the third actor that struggles for power after the 
January uprisings. Tarek Osman noted in this context that “liberal” does not 
necessarily reflect the western understanding of the term. Liberalism in Egypt, as 
stated, is defined as a sort of secularism. Challenges the liberal movement faces are 
its fragmentation, like in the case of the Islamist movement, as well as the lack of 
interesting rhetoric which would attract society’s attention on a greater scale.  
 
 
Maye Kassem contended that although the revolution 
has broken the fear of authority, the authoritarian culture 
and political structure remain intact. Kassem warned of a 
possible continuity of the military rule. The military, as 
argued, is able to stay in power if it decides to. According 
to her, one reason why the Mubarak regime fell is that it 
has lost its legitimacy, what can be blamed on the lack of  
sound economic progress as well as Egypt’s declining position as a major player in 
the Middle East. 
Another crucial issue which made the overthrow of the Mubarak regime possible lies 
in the alienation of the military and its steady loss of power during the time of 
Mubarak’s rule. Due to that, the army refused to intervene in the Egyptian revolt 
against the president’s reign, as they had nothing to gain by protecting the regime. 
Kassem further emphasized the need for a useful strategy in order to profoundly 
change the political system of Egypt. Referring to the current debate concerning the 
necessity to change the Egyptian constitution, Maye Kassem stated that solely the 
change of the constitution does not lead to changes of the nature of the country’s 
political structure. The fivefold constitutional change in the years 1953-1979, as 
asserted, exemplifies this argument. 
Conclusively, with regard to the upcoming legislative elections, Kassem drew 
attention to the fact that continuity may prevail over change if the members of the 
National Democratic Party (NDP), the former ruling party, find themselves back in the 
new parliament. They have not completely disappeared from the political scene, but 
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instead formed new parties, which will try to gain seats during the September 
elections.  
 
The second round table focused on the crucial question in the context of the ongoing 
transition over what kind of change is probable and possible in the light of the 
country’s social, political and economic situation. 
 
Abou Elela Mady offered his views on the kind of 
democracy that may emerge as well as the limits of 
freedom. Elela Mady identified two factors in regard to the 
question of the possible kind of democracy in Egypt. 
Firstly, as argued, the presidential-parliamentary system 
would be the most suitable for Egypt because it offers the 
division of power between the president and the prime   
minister. The electoral system should be based on proportional representation. 
Secondly, the establishment of the rule of law and social justice are indispensable for 
a functioning democratic system. Mady stressed that the future parliament needs to 
deal with relevant issues as unemployment, education and health care. 
Under the Mubarak regime, as elaborated, the problem was not the Islamic nature of 
law, but despotism and corruption of the ruling elite. Justice and freedom namely, as 
argued, are crucial for the Islamic principles, as it emphasizes the equality of people 
regardless of religion, colour or gender.   
With regard to the limits of freedom Mady pointed out that the individual freedom 
cannot be contradictory with freedom of other members of society, as well as the 
majority has to respect the rights and freedom of the minority. Thus, e.g. the 
Muslims, who constitute the majority in Egypt, do not have the right to, for instance, 
deprive Christians of running for a public office. Mady professed that women and 
minorities should have equal rights and should be equally eligible to run for 
presidency.  
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According to Esra Abdel Fatah Rashed, not the difficult 
economic and social situation, but the Egyptian people’s 
demand for freedom, justice and the collapse of the 
regime were the decisive catalyzers for the protests on 
Tahrir Square. As for the question whether social 
change is possible, Abdel Fatah argued that in fact it is, 
noting that in the light of the successful overthrowing 
of the Mubarak regime, everything is possible to the power of people. However, 
achieving social change will not be easy. In order to initiate a successful social and 
economic change, profound political reforms are indispensable. 
For the purpose of freedom, justice and social and economic development, as stated, 
the rule of law and solid democratic institutions are needed. Another important aspect 
that needs to be considered with regard to social change is the establishment of a 
new education system, which will help to raise a well-educated generation capable of 
understanding the real meaning of freedom and democracy. Abdel Fatah further 
drew attention to the role of women in Egypt, strongly criticizing the ignorance 
towards their role in the society, visible most notably in their strong 
underrepresentation in political committees or even in the media when it comes to 
discussing issues of social relevance.  
Abdel Fatah argued that Egyptian women should actively fight for their rights and 
participate in the political life, instead of just waiting for better days. Hence, the role of 
Egyptian civil society concerning the raising of people’s political awareness is of 
essential importance. It should, as stated, especially now, with regard to the 
parliamentary elections, actively encourage people to participate in the political 
process.  
Conclusively, Abdel Fatah stressed the high significance of international dialogue, 
not only between the governments, but also and foremost between the western and 
Arab civil societies and people.  
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Subsequently, Tarek Osman elaborated on the 
question whether Egypt is ready for liberal democracy. 
The advantages of the Egyptian liberal movement 
include the legislative and cultural heritage, as well as 
infrastructure and the political project of liberalism. 
Another important aspect is that the liberal movement 
has gained momentum. During the demonstrations, the Liberals were a relevant 
force which inspired most notably the young Egyptians to fight for change.  
Challenges which Liberals face today may, among others, include the lack of real 
leaders, fragmentation, their weak constituencies, poor logistics and bad funding as 
well as their complicated discourse, which makes the connection with people very 
difficult.  
A 70 years old problem of sectarianism does not work for the advantage of Egypt’s 
liberal movement either, as the gap between Muslims and Christians has had harmful 
effects on the Egyptian society. 
Tarek Osman argued that the development of democracy in general, is to a great 
extent attributed to the development of Egypt’s economic situation. The power of the 
private sector in the country plays in this context a crucial role. For the first time in 
Egypt’s economic history the private sector employs the highest number of workers, 
what gives people a better chance to become economically independent of the state. 
Although the capital markets in Egypt are partially controlled by people who stood 
close to the Mubarak regime, more than 70 per cent of the GDP is generated by the 
medium size business sector.  
As for the question whether Egyptian people long for a liberal way of living, Osman 
argued that for the vast majority of the Egyptian society, being the middle class, 
liberal lifestyle, which also includes considerations and decisions concerning issues 
like for example abortion, is not that relevant. 
 
Summarizing, the panel discussion featured several different points of view on the 
topic. The speakers presented a whole range of various perspectives and positively 
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contributed to the popular understanding of the protests in Egypt, including its driving 
forces, and their possible meaning for the country’s future development. 
The speakers agreed that it is yet unclear in which direction Egypt will go in the years 
to come. The result of the current struggle for power between different interest 
groups, and the outcome of the upcoming parliamentary elections may surely be a 
breakthrough in Egypt’s transition. The roles of Egyptian civic society and 
internationally promoted dialogue, as in the discussion often emphasized, are of high 
significance for the establishment of a functioning democratic order in Egypt. 
Nevertheless, for now the country is facing many challenges emerging in its 
dynamically changing political reality. Disagreements over the country’s political 
future and economic order have already become vividly clear. Many questions, most 
notably regarding the future role of the military or the development of the political 
character of the Muslim Brotherhood, still remain unanswered. So far the revolution 
has generally been perceived as successful. However, the future will tell for sure 
whether the mass protests on Tahrir Square have truly been a turning point in the 
country’s history.  
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Panel Discussion, 7 June 2011 
 
Welcome 
Otmar Höll, Director oiip 
Sabine Kroissenbrunner, Head of the Task Force Dialogue of Cultures; Federal Ministry for 
European and International Affairs 
 
Panel I: Will continuity prevail over change? 
Discussants: 
Vladimir Gligorov, Professor at Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies 
Maye Kassem, American University in Cairo 
Tarek Osman, Writer, London/Cairo 
Chair: Corinna Milborn, Writer and Journalist 
 
Panel II: What kind of change? How to deal with pluralism in what kind of democracy? 
Discussants: 
Abou Elela Mady, Chairman El-Wasat Party, Cairo 
Esra Abd El Fatah Rashed, Egyptian Democratic Academy, Cairo 
Tarek Osman, Writer, London/Cairo 
Chair: Cengiz Günay, oiip 
Venue: Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, Favoritenstrasse 15a, 1040 Vienna 
 
The panel discussion was organized by the Austrian Institute for International Affairs – oiip in 
cooperation with Ideaz – the Platform for Intercultural and Comparative Research, and the ANNA 
LINDH FOUNDATION and support by the Foreign Ministry and the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna. 
 
 
                            
              
